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those creditors from "knowledge" to "notice." 47 The first proposal differs only slightly from the careful inquiry actions suggested by the trial
court and the dissent in Adrian Tabin. The second proposal has the
merits of being simple and easy to effectuate. Either would greatly

reduce the possibility of bulk transfers in defraud of creditors. In the
last analysis, Adrian Tabin is truly a fulfillment of the prophecy of
White and Summers that section 6-104(3) "may prove to be unwise."48
HENRY ALEXANDER EASLEY, III

Constitutional Law-The Indigent and Access to the Civil Courts
Recent decisions in state and federal courts have attempted to

define the scope of an indigent's right to obtain free access to civil
courts.' The United States Supreme Court responded to the confusion
created by several of these decisions with United States v. Kras,2 which

presented a constitutional challenge to the filing fee requirement for the
initiation of bankruptcy proceedings. The Court refused to extend its
holding in Boddie v. Connecticut3 to bankruptcy actions and rejected
the indigent petitioner's constitutional attack on mandatory filing fees. 4

This decision not only upholds the constitutionality of filing fees in
bankruptcy proceedings but also provides some guidelines for determining the constitutionality of similar fees in other areas of civil litigation.
Robert W. Kras submitted his petition in bankruptcy to the United
4

See UCC § 1-201(25).
& SUMMERS § 19-3, at 650. Before one assumes from the Adrian Tabin decision that
such a transferor consequently escapes the criminal laws and the grasp of his creditors,
two points are of noteworthy significance. First, UCC § 6-104, Comment 3, states that "the
sanction for the accuracy of the list of creditors is the criminal law of the state relative to failse
... Second, other creditors' remedies such as attachment and execution pursuant to
swearing.
judgment on other assets of the transferor are available. Furthermore, no provision in Article 6
precludes an attack on a bulk transfer as a fraudulent conveyance.
"WHITE

'In re Garland, 428 F.2d 1185 (1st Cir. 1970); Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, (D.C. Cir. 1970);
Bacon v. Graham, 348 F. Supp. 996 (D. Ariz. 1972); Almarez v. Carpenter, 347 F. Supp. 597 (D.
Colo. 1972); In re Smith, 341 F. Supp. 1297 (N.D. Il1. 1972); Application of Ottman, 336 F. Supp.
746 (E.D. Wis. 1972); O'Brien v. Trevethan, 336 F. Supp. 1029 (D. Conn. 1972); Robinson v.
Kaufman, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970); Danforth v. State Dept. of Health and
Welfare, 303 A. 2d 794 (Maine 1973).
2409 U.S. 434 (1973).
3401 U.S. 371 (1971). The Court held filing fees in divorce actions unconstitutional as applied
to indigents.
1409 U.S. at 443-50.
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States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.' Simultane-

ously he moved for permission to proceed with the litigation without
first satisfying the filing fee requirement," contending that his status as
an indigent required waiver of the prerequisite fee.7 He accordingly

advanced three arguments in support of his request: (1) that the federal
in forma pauperis statute' applied; (2) that the common law sanctioned

such procedure; and (3) that the filing fee as applied to indigents was a
denial of due process and equal protection? The district court rejected

the first two arguments,10 and the Supreme Court agreed." Accordingly,
this note will be limited to an analysis of the constitutional argument
advanced by the petitioner.

The district court characterized access to the judicial process as a
"fundamental right", and declared the filing fee to be a denial of equal

protection." However, on appeal by the government," the Supreme
Court reversed the lower court in a divided opinion. 4 The majority
emphasized three essential points: (1) a discharge in bankruptcy is not
a "fundamental right" subject to constitutional protection; (2) private
avenues of relief outside the judicial process were available to the petitioner; and (3) the fee provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, as applied,
constituted a reasonable exercise of governmental power. 5 In rebuttal,
the dissent of Justices Brennan and Douglas stressed that a classification
5

1n re Kras, 331 F. Supp. 1207 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
Old.
'Id. at 1208-1I. The evidence indicated that Kras was unemployed, did not have any nonexempt assets, and derived his only income from welfare payments. His outstanding debts
amounted to over $6,000.
128 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1970).
'409 U.S. at 439-41.
10331 F. Supp. at 1209-10. The district court decision has received analysis in the following
materials: Comment, Boddie and Beyond: Rights of the Indigent Civil Litigant, 18 CATH. LAW.
67 (1972); Comment, Access to Bankruptcy Courts for Indigents: The Extension of Boddie v.
Conn., 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 328 (1971); Note, Bankruptcy-FilingFees Subjected to Constitutional Test, 50 N.C.L. REV. 654 (1972); Note, Bankruptcy-FilingFees Deny Indigents' Fundamental Interest in Access to Courts Under Due Process and Equal Protection Guarantees, 18
WAYNE L. REv. 1431 (1972); 60 GEo. L.J. 1581 (1972).
"409 U.S. at 439-40.
12331 F. Supp. at 1210-15. The district court applied the equal protection guarantee as a part
of the fifth amendment due process requirement.
"See 28 U.S.C. § 1252 (1970). The statute permits the government to appeal directly to the
Supreme Court if a statute is declared unconstitutional by a district court.
"409 U.S. at 434. The decision was five to four. Justices Blackmun, Burger, White, Powell,
and Rehenquist formed the majority, while Justices Brennan, Douglas, Stewart and Marshall
dissented.
"5409 U.S. at 444-49.
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based on wealth is inherently suspect, invoking strict judicial inspection."6 Accordingly, they reasoned that the application of the filing fee
requirement to petitioner constituted invidious discrimination which
resulted in a denial of his constitutional rights.' 7
To understand the constitutional issue presented by these opposing
opinions in Kras, it is necessary to examine the Supreme Court's decision in Boddie, 8 a challenge to the constitutionality of Connecticut's
mandatory filing fee in divorce actions. In Boddie the Court ruled that
the marriage relationship is an interest of "fundamental" importance'
and declared that the state could not condition the individual's access
to the sole legal means of terminating the marriage relationship on the
basis of wealth.2 The Court found that such an action by the state was
an unreasonable
deprivation of liberty and therefore a denial of due
2
process. '
Even though no criminal proceedings were involved in Boddie, it
is easy to understand why the withholding of a means of divorce constituted a deprivation of liberty. The state alone has the power to terminate
a marriage, 22 and so long as an existing marriage is in effect, intimate
association with another member of the opposite sex could result in
criminal prosecution for adultery.2 Furthermore, private separation
without legal sanction provides the individual spouse with no legally
enforceable right against the other spouse with respect to the distribution of marital property24 or child custody. 25 Such consequences result
from state participation in the marriage contract and thus constitute a
deprivation of individual liberty through state action.
Faced with the possibility of such limitations on individual liberty,
a potential civil litigant is entitled to an opportunity to be heard.2 This
"Id. at 457.
' 7Id. at 458. However, Justices Stewart and Marshall felt that the decision should have been
made in the same manner as in Boddie, using the strict due process approach. They did not feel
that the case could be distinguished from Boddie, and therefore concluded that petitioner could be
afforded relief without the application of equal protection standards. Id. at 451.
18401 U.S. 371 (1971).
"Id. at 376.
2'Id. at 380-81.
211d.

2CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-13 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-5 (Supp. 1971).
2'No. 176, [1949] Conn. Pub. Acts 150 (repealed 1969); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-185 (Supp.
1971).
2
'See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-21 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.3 (Supp. 197 1).
z'See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46-23, -24 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 50-13.1 to 13.3 2(Supp. 1971).
1Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971).
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right is embraced within the due process concept of fundamental fairness." Therefore the majority in Boddie refused to allow a state to
condition the right to a hearing on the payment of a fee.28 In arriving
at this decision, the Court did not address the matter of inequality
among citizens seeking access to civil courts but rather stressed the
problem of inherently unfair treatment by the state of a particular individual.
However, in concurring opinions, Justices Douglas and Brennan
expressed their belief that the filing fee requirement created inequalities
in access to divorce proceedings on the basis of wealth, and therefore,
constituted a denial of equal protection. 9 This position, which was
adopted by the district court in Kras,30 requires analysis.
Since no state action is involved in the bankruptcy proceeding, the
fourteenth amendment is not applicable. Nevertheless, the equal protection requirement has been imposed on the exercise of federal power,3
and arguably, all aspects of that guarantee are included within the fifth
amendment due process standard.32 In evaluating a statute which has
been challenged on equal protection grounds, courts normally apply
either the compelling governmental interest test33 or the rational basis
test.34
The compelling interest test is used if a fundamental right is involved or if the classification effected results from the use of a suspect
category.35 Among the fundamental interests delineated by the Supreme Court are voting, 3 procreation, 37 interstate travel, 38 marriage, 39 and criminal procedures. 0 Suspect categories include race,'
27Id.
111d. at 380-81.
"Id. at 383 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 386 (Brennan, J., concurring).
"331 F. Supp. at 1211-12.
"Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
32See, e.g., cases cited in Lee v. Habib, 424 F.2d 891, 898 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
"E.g., Goosby v. Osser, 409 U.S. 512, 519-20 (1973); United States v. Carolene Products
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
"McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
"Cases cited note 33 supra.
-See, e.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964).
Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
"Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel.
"See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
"See, e.g., Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
"See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
"See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
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ancestry," alienage, 3 and poverty on a conditional basis.4
The Supreme Court has on occasion appeared to include poverty
as a category equal in importance to race. In McDonald v. Board of
Elections45 the court stated, "[A] careful examination

. . .

is especially

warranted where lines are drawn on the basis of wealth or race, .. .
two factors which would independently render a classification highly
suspect and thereby demand a more exacting judicial scrutiny."4 Again
in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections47 the Court asserted, "[L]ines
drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those of race

. . .

are

traditionally disfavored. ' 48 However, an analysis of the above cases
reveals that the Court was not only dealing with discrimination on the
basis of wealth, but also with discrimination in respect to voting rights
which the Court has considered worthy of constitutional protection as
a fundamental interest." Thus, wealth, or the lack of it, standing alone
has not been sufficient to subject a statute to the compelling governmental interest test.
This conclusion is supported by the recent decision in San Antonio
0 In that case, the Court
Independent School District v. Rodriguez."
upheld a Texas public school financing plan under which each school
district received funds commensurate with the tax valuation of the property within that particular district. Holding that the plan did not violate
the equal protection clause, the Court refused to apply the compelling
state interest test since classifications based on wealth are not inherently
suspect 5' and since the right to an education is not a fundamental right."2
The majority noted that the Court "has never heretofore held that
wealth discrimination alone provides an adequate basis for invoking
strict scrutiny . . . 53
"See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
13See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
"See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (1969).
45394 U.S. 802 (1969).
Old. at 807.
47383 U.S. 663 (1966).
"Id. at 668.
"McDonald v. Board of Elections, 394 U.S. 802 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections,
383 U.S. 663 (1966); see San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. I, 29
(1973); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1124 (1968).
-411 U.S. 1 (1973).
"Id. at 28.
"Id. at 37.

mid. at 29. See also James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), in which the Court upheld a
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Since poverty alone is not adequate to invoke the compelling interest test, the district court in Kras characterized access to the courts as
a "fundamental" right. 4 Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in
Boddie stated that position as follows:
Courts are the central dispute-settling institutions in our society. They
are bound to do equal justice under law, to rich and poor alike. They
fail to perform their function in accordance with the Equal Protection
Clause if they shut their doors to indigent plaintiffs altogether ....
A state may not make its judicial processes available to some but deny
them to others simply because they cannot pay a fee. 5
However, Justice Harlan's majority opinion in Boddie was specifically limited to divorce proceedings,56 and it is this limited approach to
which the Court adhered in Kras. In fact, Kras does not approach the
issue of access generally, but rather speaks to the constitutional significance of access to a particular type of relief.57 This concept, which the
Court appears to have adopted, is aptly expressed by Professor Goodpaster.
The right of access . . . stretches across . . . a continuum of interests
from the trivial to the most significant. Aside from its general use in
the resolution of private disputes, access to the courts takes its specific
importance and coloration from the right or interest it is being used
to protect. The fundamentalness of the right of access . . . is, therefore, a conclusion to be drawn in the particular case. 8
Having recognized this analysis as the Court's preferred method of
approach, what then distinguishes a discharge in bankruptcy from the
dissolution of marriage such that the latter is designated "fundamental"
while the former is not? The Constitution provides that Congress may
establish uniform bankruptcy standards, but no constitutional provision
requires that a means of obtaining a discharge shall be granted. In fact
California requirement for a local referendum as a prerequisite to construction of federally funded
low-income housing. The provision had been attacked as a denial of equal protection, but the Court
found no suspect category nor fundamental right present.
11331 F. Supp. at 1213-14.
0401 U.S. at 388-89 (Brennan, J., concurring); see Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402
U.S. 954 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting); Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S. 27 (1885).
11401 U.S. at 382-83.
11409 U.S. at 446-47.
"Goodpaster, The Integrationof Equal Protection,Due ProcessStandards,and the Indigent's
Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223, 253-54 (1970).
"U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
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except for three short periods, which together total only about fifteen
years, no such relief was available during the first one hundred years of
the republic.". Secondly, the individual has the option of private settlement of his debts, and therefore he is not permanently hampered in any
of his "fundamental" associations because of the government's failure
to act. Furthermore, in contrast to the state's participation in every valid
marriage celebration," the government is not a party to the formation
of private monetary obligations from which a petitioner might seek a
discharge.
Certain problems with these distinctions are readily apparent. To
the truly indigent person, private settlement, although a theoretical alternative, may be a practical impossibility. In addition, even though the
government did not participate in the formation of the debt, that obligation is good only because of the judicial processes that are available to
effect enforcement."2 Such considerations seem to be directly related to
the fundamental fairness concept.
Perhaps it is because of this relationship, which may be the essence
of the dilemma, that the Court in Kras discussed the actual possibilities
of paying the required fee. The Court stated, "[T]his much available
revenue [$1.28 per week] should be within his able-bodied reach when
the adjudication in bankruptcy has stayed collection and has brought to
a halt whatever harassment, if any, he may have sustained ....,,13
In
view of this language, it seems plausible that the majority believed that
the filing fee requirement was fair even to the indigent. If so, this belief
may have enabled the Court to overcome the objections made above to
the points relied upon to distinguish the bankruptcy problem from the
divorce issue previously decided in Boddie.
Although no fundamental right or suspect category was deemed
present in Kras, the statute was still subject to assault on equal protection grounds, but in the context of the more lenient rational basis standard.64 Under that standard, inequalities are allowed to exist if some set
of facts will reasonably justify the law.6" The legislative intent to provide
0409 U.S. at 447.
"See C. FOOTE, R.
8409

LEVY

& F. SANDER,

CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAmILY LAW

170 (1966).

U.S. at 455 (Stewart, J., dissenting).

"Id. at 449.
"Id.at 447-49; Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56 (1971). In Lindsey, the court upheld conditions
on entry into court in a housing eviction case, but struck down the required double appeal bond
on the grounds that there was no rational justification for it.
"E.g., San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
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funds for the operation of the court system was a purpose sufficient to
satisfy the rational basis test.66 This reasoning seems well based in precedent, and, accordingly, once the determination is made that the compelling governmental interest test will not be applied, the indigent's
constitutional thrust is effectively parried.
In refusing to recognize access to the courts generally as a fundamental right, it seems apparent that the Court examined certain policy
considerations. Acceptance of the position taken by the lower court in
Kras could conceivably result in demands upon the judicial system
which would necessitate the expenditure of public funds and resources
not presently allocated. Specifically, if the indigent is guaranteed access
to the civil courts on the basis of equal protection, it follows logically
that he should receive equal access.67 Equal access might be construed
to require government provided counsel, discovery expenses, and appeal
fees. Obviously the achievement of complete equality would be difficult,
and the brand of equality actually effected might be more onerous to
the public than the present system. 8 For example, if the indigent person
received subsidized assistance, he would actually be in a better position
than the person able to bear the expense, who must base his decision
on whether to litigate by balancing his costs against his chances of
success. Such an exercise in equal protection could only result in arbitrary line-drawing.
Although filing fees are not a widespread problem due to the availability of in forma pauperis procedures,69 the Kras case appears to be a
clear indication that the Supreme Court does not favor the use of equal
protection reasoning as a vehicle for obtaining free access to the civil
courts. Ortwein v. Schwab,7" decided subsequent to Kras, is further
evidence of this intent. In Ortwein, the Court recognized a due process
right to a hearing prior to a reduction in welfare payments but refused
to prohibit a state from conditioning the right of appeal on the basis of
a filing fee.7' Even though the appeal in Ortwein was from an adminis11409 U.S. at 447-49; Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 550-55 (1949).
6T

The writer recognizes that the equal protection clause as it is presently applied does not
require absolute equality. The point made here is one resting on logic and is designed to point out
the dilemma with which the Court must cope when the controlling concept is declared to be equal
protection.
"'See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 34-35 (1956) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
"'See M'Clenahan v. Thomas, 6 N.C. 198 (1813); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-110 (Supp. 1971), 1112 (1969), 1-288 (Supp. 1971), 6-24 (1969), 52A-11.1 (1966).
70410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam).
71
1d. at 659-60; see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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trative hearing and sought initial access into the court system, the Court
reaffirmed its position that there is no constitutional right to appeal.72
Thus in determining the right of access, the Court looked not only to
the type of relief sought, but also to the stage of the judicial process
involved. 73 This holding points out that the due process concept of
fairness does not necessarily lead to the far-reaching expansion which
logically follows if the standard is equality of access.
Although the Court does not seem inclined to increase the presently
delineated fundamental rights, 74 it is important to consider what requirements may result in an area categorized as "fundamental". In the field
of criminal procedure, transcripts for appeal, 75 waiver of filing fees on
appeal,76 and court appointed counsel on appea 77 have ensued from the
application of the strict equal protection standard. Since Boddie
declared marriage a fundamental right, it seems reasonable to expect
similar developments if that decision is logically expanded. The New
York Supreme Court has already reacted in this direction. 78 Although
such expansion may be curtailed by the Supreme Court, the designation
of marriage as a fundamental interest by the Court necessarily appears
to invoke the compelling governmental interest test when dealing with
restrictions upon the exercise of divorce proceeding. Thus, it follows
that the designation of access to the civil courts as a "fundamental"
right would require application of the same stringent compelling interest
test to any judicial evaluation of procedures affecting access. Accordingly, it seems reasonable to conclude that fear of the far-reaching
repercussions of the designation "fundamental" was the basic justification for the Court's refusal to consider specifically the broad concept
of access to the civil courts.
In conclusion, certain observations can be made on the basis of
Kras. If the issue of access involves a previously delineated fundamental
right, and the civil courts provide the exclusive available remedy, the
Court will impose the due process right of an unconditional opportunity
to be heard. However, the Court appears determined to prevent the
72410 U.S. at 659-60; McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1893).

73

See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. at 659-60.
"San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodgriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973). "It is not
the province of this Court to create substantive constitutional rights in the name of guaranteeing
equal protection of the law." But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
"Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
71Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959).
"Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
"'Vanderpool v. Vanderpool, 344 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
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introduction of the equal protection compelling interest requirements in
this area of the law and, accordingly, will not designate access to the
civil courts generally as a fundamental right.79 Such a course seems wise
to this writer. Government is not shackled with the command to achieve
the impossible goal of equality; yet the Court retains the option to
eliminate unfairness in specific areas where the burden on the indigent
is unreasonably heavy.
IRVIN WHITE HANKINS

III

Employment Discrimination-Building Up the Headwinds

In 1971 the United States Supreme Court held in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.' that a private employer's hiring practices violated the mandate of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 Faced with a showing
of racially discriminatory impact without intent,3 a unanimous Court 4
concluded that "employment procedures or testing mechanisms that

operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups"5 were invalid absent proof of genuine "business necessity"' within the scope of the Title
"But see Note, Free Access to the Civil Courts as a FundamentalConstitutionalRight: The
Waiving of Filing Fees for Indigents, 8 NEw ENG. REV. 275, 302 (1973). This note states the novel
proposition that since the Supreme Court did not specifically address the concept of access to the
courts generally, the designation of that concept as a fundamental right by the lower courts remains
intact.
1401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Court invalidated Duke Power's requirement of a high school
diploma and satisfactory aptitude test scores for employment in all non-labor force departments.
The requirement was instituted, without a meaningful validation study, despite the successful
performance of non-high school graduates already employed in those departments.
2Civil Rights Act of 1964 [hereinafter cited as Act], §§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e to 2000e15 (1970), as amended, Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. §§2000e to
2000e-15 (Supp. 1972). For pertinent portions of the Act see text accompanying note 18 infra. For
a recent analysis of the application of Title VII to hiring practices see Note, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1119-51 (1971).
'An analysis of the doctrine of unintentional discrimination is not within the scope of this
note. It is now generally accepted that intent is unnecessary for the establishment of a violation of
Title VII. See, e.g., Sprogis v. United Airlines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 991 (1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.) petition for cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971). However, it is clear that an employment practice must have a discriminatory
impact to violate Title VII. See, e.g., Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 326 F. Supp. 198, 202-03
(S.D.N.Y. 1971). For a detailed discussion of the ramifications of the Court's redefinition of
discrimination see Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the Concept
of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1972).
'Mr. Justice Brennan did not participate.
'401 U.S. at 432.
'See notes 20-33 infra and accompanying text.

